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a® Z@ro-stiia fwo-persoa Gam® 
Consider a contest among a s«t of players, wiier© tii® 
skill of th# players m&, possibly, eteaet events effect th.e 
outeome# Gall the set of all rules of the ooatest the game* 
ana any partiemlar ©ours® the eoatest may take, from begin'* 
Eing to @M, a Play* Smppos# the gmm preaoribes, for any 
play, payments to the players» Profits are denoted by 
positive payments, and losBes siiown by negative payments* 
It is ass«iie4 that at most a finite number of situa­
tions can arise in the contest, and»at each situation, at 
raost a finite nuaber of alternatives is available to the 
player or chanoe device laafcing the ehoiee in this situation# 
'3?ben, each of the players ean speoify, previous'to a play of 
the eontest, exactly which choice will be made for every 
possible situation in which he mi..ght have an option* All 
infomation allowable under the gam© can be included as a 
basis for a choice, so this pre-speslfication entails no 
disadvantage to the player* A complete —exhaustive and 
unambiguous-:?- set of such choices is called a atrate^ y> andi 
under the asguaptions aad® above, there is at most a finite 
number of etrategies for each player. 
If chance events siay effect the outcome of the contest, 
coaeider all possible situations where a chance device may 
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fflakd a claoie®, and select oa© of these etooioes arbitrarily. 
Call a ooaplet© s®t of sucl ehoia»8 an woire^ a ehoie®. and,' 
from tb® assmaptioas afeoT®, tli®re is at aost a finite auiaber 
of yffipir@*B cliolees. L@t the probaMllties for mj chano® 
•doTlee's makiag its e!ioi©es. b® known. Th&n^  tlio probability 
of ooeurron®® for any uaipir©*a ehoie® eaa b® found. 
If ®6©li of til® players s®l®®ts a strategy, and an 
umpire's clioic® is ehos®a,. a play of tli® contest mn be eon-
structed, and papa©nts assigned to tli® players. Sine® an 
umpire's cboie® Ms a defiait# probability of oecurrenee, all 
possible umpire's olioioes mm. b© ooEsidered, for a fixed set 
of players' strategiest and the aatleaatioal expectation of 
tbe paymeEt® ean be ealculated# fbu®, for eaeii set of strat­
egies selected by tbe players, a »et of payments {in tbe 
se-nse of expeotatioaj caa be assi®i®d tlie players. 
Vihm the contest is between two plai^ rs, its rules are 
called a twoopersoa gam®. Wmn the sum of the payment® is 
aero for eTery possible play under the game, it is ealled a 
zero»0uii game. A zero»sum two-person gam® describes a ©on-
test between two players where on® player wins exaotly the 
saa® payment that the other player loses. laoh player 
selects a strategy, and the gam© then specifies a payment 
whieh one player must make to the other# 
Let players P_ and P enter a contest under a two-
person zero-sum game. Suppose has m possible strategies. 
3 
labeled 1,2, and P ka.s n possible strategies, called 
V 
1 , a , .  L i t  t f e ®  p a y m e n t  t ©  f e ©  p ^ ,  a n d  t h #  p a y m e n t  t o  
Py "b© Py. Call tli© s©t ©f all strat©gi®s for each plajer M 
or 1 resptcti-rely, wltii a typieal ©l®a®nt i or 'fliat is, 
reading »€," as "is (he) m ®l«a®a% of*, on# oaa writ® 
i €. M * Cl,g,,,,,m), J €. If • Cl,S,.,,,,n). 
'a©n, the deseriptioa aboT# b®es»«@. 
Pa; - P3cCi,J), 
For ©onTeni#iie#, d@flii©,-
®i| * * •* I) * i €, M, J €. H, 
i. • C®£j)« 
The domains of i and J ar® independent of each other, and 
A is an a by n matrix, oalled .a p&yoff liatrias:. Any row of A 
id©iitifi®s a strategy seleetioa W wMl® any ooliimn of A 
represents a selection of a strategy toy P^ # If tooth players 
want to realize a moat favorable outcoae, will wish to 
maximiz©, and P will want to miaimiz®, the entry of A which 
a 
Is iiltiiMitely selected by the intersection of the row and 
eol«ffln chosen by each of the players* 
In a certain rational sense <1, pp# 90), a theory can be 
developed for soae, but not all, games ia the formulation 
gi^ en above. However, the adoption of a decisive new concept 
in strategy selection will permit m rational theory which 
inclmdes all zero^ sm two*person. games* 
'fhe consideration of certain simple games, such as 
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mateJalag paanies (1, pp. 143), sliows that a player may b® 
outwittet aai ptinisbed If li© is rtt^ ired to select, on tb® 
basis of bis ©m reasoning., a particular strategy for a play 
of a ©oat®st». la Ti®* ©f tMi it ia Aenaaded only tbat a 
player stat© tb® probability witb wbieb b® will play a. 
partieular strategy* Tbat is, iuat^ aA of selsotiag e strat* 
egy* l®t tb® player select a probability for playing ©aob of 
all poisibl© strategies* Gall tb® probability of playing 
tb© itb strategy ami tb« probability of playing tb® 
m strategy Ty IbB eolleotion of Is a Teotor In 1„. 
luoliaean a spao®, aM tb® eollaetioa of y^  is a Teetor in 
\t say 
X • , y • {yjh 
If tb® players s®l®et tb© sets of probabilities# x and 
y, for playing tbeir strategies, tb® expe©t©€ TOIu® for tb® 
payoff will b® 
wb®r@ tb# eonTention of smmitig r«p®at®<i iMl©©@ tbrougb 
tbeir domain® of iofinition is adoptei. 
fbe s®ts X and y aust b® seta of mutually ©xoIusIt® 
and.txbamstiT® probabilities# Ws® tb® definitions, 
1 tor all i, ® « (®fJ, 2 • (®ij) * 
Then, tb® eontitions on x and y b®eoa@ 
X® • If * «jyj* i» 
> 0 for all it yj > 0 all J# (2a) 
§ 
'Bi® ©^etors x and y ar© called styatQaies. Let 
X be til® sat of all z satisfying {2) anfi (Ba), and J be th® 
set of all y satisfying {2) ani (Sal# fli© uait veotors of 
aad ^  ar® ©lemeata of X and T respeetiiroly# fkese unit 
Teetors are called -pure strategies, aM represent an actual 
row or ©olwaii seleetioa of A* Heme®, laixed strategies 
iaclud® all tlie previous notions oa strategy selection. It 
turns omt tliat the concept of ai.x«d strategies will permit 
tlie foimulation of a rational theory for the playing of any 
zero-sum two-person gaia©, 
.i^ operties of Qaaes 
It is asatmed that the readeir is acquainted with the 
notions of geometric convexity (i» pp« 1B8) and the func­
tional operators MaXj^  and Minj. {!» PP« 80) • 
A stat«i©nt of the utmost importance in the theory of 
games is due originally to John von Heuaann. It is stated 
here without proof fl, pp» 1531* 
Theorem. (Ifein "aeorem for zero-sua two-person gaiaes.) 
Let A be an arbitrary real matrix# fhen there exist vectors, 
X® c X, y® T, and a real number, 4, such that for every 
X ^  X, y c T, 
x®ly > A > xAy®* (3) 
i 
la gam© t&ms, this tlieoireia asserts tJaat has a mixed 
strategy, x®, wMoli, will guarant®# a payoff of not less than 
A, while Py has & mixed strategy, y®, whish will guarant®® 
a payoff of mt aor© than &» Thm, & is a point of iiEpasse, 
heyond which neither pl®y®r n®«4 he allowed by an opponent, 
fhi® point of,impasse» 4, is eali#d th® falm® of th© game A. 
A strat®gy, x® or y®| whieh guarantees that an opponent will 
not h® allowed a more faTorabl® payoff th«li A is called an 
OBtiaal strategyfc A pair of suoh,strategies, x® and y® is 
©ailed a golwtion* Let the s@t of all 3£® h©' X®, th© set of 
all y® -he Y®# fo eaphasig® the d®p®ndene® of A, X®, Y® on A, 
they may b® irritteni MA.) •, S®{A|» T®{A). 
Using th®s® definition®, th® Main fh®or@a states that 
eirery z®ro-stM two-person gas© ha« a Tain®, and each player 
has en optimal strategy whieh guarantees him that valti®. 
In a certain,sense, rational playing implies th© us® of th® 
optimal strateglesi and the -ralm® of th® gam® represents a 
measur® of th® utility of th® gas® itself to th® players* 
A gam® whioh has zero vain® is eall®d a fair gam@« 
111® main problem in th® th©o3py of th® zero-suit two-
parson gaaes at th® pr®s®nt tia® is to find ra@thods for 
obtaining, the Talu® and sets of optimal strategies for a 
giTen gaa®'# 
Soa® well Imown prop®rti®s of games ar® giT©n her®, with 
demonstrations when spaee penaits, and references otharwis®'. 
? 
Frowrty 1. Th® Main. 'Kieorem ean b@ given in tli© following 
©quiTalent forms. 
Am Imt A to® arbitrary * Timu tli©r® #xist Teetors, 
.X® €, X, y® c T# ant a number, 4, that> 
*^i®^ ij 
B, jUt A b@ arbitrary, an<l tb# 4oiiain of x b© X, th© 
.domain of y b© T. lh«n, acAy .kas a .smtile point# ®iat is, 
tla©r® exist Testers x®  ^X, y® €, f sueli tliat, 
x®Ay > 3£:®Ay® > xAy® for ev«iry x: c 3C, y ^  Y» {SB) 
C., L©t A b© arbitrary, ani tlie domain of x b© 2:, the 
domain of y b® Y# Tben, 
ftitirX.Ay « Mi ft {SC) 
Property 2« X® and Y® ar# coairea: liyp®r-polyli®dra» 
Property L#t A and B be two gaats, x "^ ® number# 
A# Let B • A * yl» fhen, «• A(A • ^^3) « A{A) + y, 
« X®(A), y®{B) » Y®CAh. 
B» L©t X > Op B « fA# 4CB) • Mx^  ^• 
X®{B) « X®CA|,, I®{B) • Y®CA). 
Demonstration of Property lA. Let x® €. X® and A b© 
©liosen by means of tM litin a®or«a« If tbe relation, 
fails, suppose it faila for J • fe. L®t y* bs defined as 
s 
* 1, • 0 for j k* fhea X, and 
x'Ay'  x'laijy'j -  ^A. 
But til© 8tat®iient of tli© Ifein 'Bit-orea is precisely tM 
r©latioa deai«i aboT®, lisiie# tia© property is shown as it 
regards to x» A s^ finaetrio arguaeat -^ 11 apply for y* 
DemonstratIon of Property IB, la the liain TJieorem, 
let X - x:® €, X®, y • y®  ^Y®, (3) b©eaa©a, 
x®ly® > > x®.ly®f or A » x*Ay®# 
Substituting tliis relation baelc into (3) , oa@ obtains (3B), 
whioto. a@fin®s a saddl® point Cl, p. 9B), 
Hefereno® for Property 10, {1, pp* 95)• 
Daaoastratioa of Property 2. toly coiiToxity is- ebown* 
Let x® €, 1®, X®* €. X®# fli©a it must be shoim tliat wkea 
0 a < 1, tben x®" « ax® + {1 • I®. I.®t y c Y. Hbon 
x®»Ay "• (ax® • Cl - «|3c®*)Ay, 
* ax®Ay + {1 - a)x®*ily, 
> * (1 •- • A# 
Heace, x®« €. X®# A symattric arguaent holds for Y®. 
For tbe aaaertioa tbat I® aad Y® are byp«r-polybedra, 
se@ (3, pp* S) and fS, p« Mh TMe statemoat appears to b© 
plausibl® through an ©iieiaiiiatioii of tb« form of Property lA, 
It is easy to se® tber©, tbat X®, for instance, is tb© inter-
sootion of the m •*- n lmlt»Bpao0B, 
%®ij ^  
Xg > 0, for all i| 
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and til# hrperplaa®, @x « 1. 
Demonstratioa of Prop#rty 3A. Lat x® s. X®Ca), 
y® I®(A), m®o, for 0T®ry x e, 2* r €, Y, 
x®Ay > i^ (A) > 
Md Y "feo ®aeh. aembtr, and us® tli© faet tliat for ©very 
z €. S, y c "ST, xiy • (x©| |®j| • !• fli©a, 
x**A^  ^  YX®l|r > a (A) •*• T > 3c4y® + 
X®{A T^ ly > A(A) •f Y > x(A + 
The last form demonstrates tiiat x* e, y® e. Y®(B),, 
£(B| « ACA) + r«  ^X®(B), y® c a similar 
demoHStration will show that x®  ^Z®{A), y® €, Y®{A). 
He»ee, the reap©©tiv® sets are identieal* 
OemoastratioB of Property SB, Siao© y > 0, the 
three laeabers in th@ stateaeat of th® Mala "^ eorem can be 
multiplied by x without altering th© iae(iualitles« 'fhen, 
the argameiits. used In Property 5A ean h® duplicated# 
Simiary 
In the seooad chapter, a'Mliaear ©xpaasioa is 
developed idtb a two-fold purpos#. First, the ©iipaaaion 
is an aid in the computation of optimal strategies and 
Yalues for eertain gam®®.. la additioa, th© expansion 
provides a "basis for the classifioation and comparison 
of Tarious games# l#Mle th© deriTatlon is algebraic in 
10 
oliaraoter, th© amt of all expansion points is shown to b© 
eraotly the set of all extremal points of th© constrained 
bilinear form obtainable by the method of LaGrange multi­
pliers • How©T©r, additional freedoa is obtained OT©r ana­
lytic expansions by requiring that, the expansion be ident­
ical t© the bilinear function only in the intersection of 
the hyper-planes ex • 1, and ey * 1* ^ 
Some of the main results of the paper are obtained in 
the third chapter, where concepts of pmaishment, lirabo, and 
reward are used ,to de^ elope criteria for playing a game. 
Ml games are divided into two clasees by these concepts, 
and m complete description of the solutions and value of any 
game can be given within the framework of these concepts# 
M operator, which arises naturally in the bilinear 
expansion, is treated in the fourth chapter# -ais operator 
divides all games of a given size into equivalence classes, 
and the properties of theae classes exhibit characteristics 
which seem pertinent to game theory.. 
In the fifth chapter, areas ar© pointed out which might 
b© tractable with an extension of the analysis. Also, a 
gaae occurring elsewhere ia the literature is analsraed,, and 
the concepts of punlstotent, limbo, and reward are displayed 
in this example# 
11 
A BlLIimm IXPMSIOM 
la this chapter, aa mprmBioik, -ralld for a certain 
class of aatrio®®, will fo«a<l wbioli has funotional ralues 
identtoal to x4j wli®a x aad f ar® restricted by {2), fb.® 
conditions for existeao® for such an ©xpressioa aT© found, 
and a ooaiparison is xaad© witli asalytie expansions# 
Set notation will b® la eoatext, 0 is the null, 
or empty, set, ISl© interiection of sets X and T, written XT, 
implies tbat if s «. SJ, thm z €. J. and z T» 
DeriTatioa 
Consider tb@ Mlinsar foim, 
mAj • i c M, J  ^M, U) 
wlier# X and y satisfy, 
z® » 1| @y « 1» (2J 
Call the set of all x whieb satisfy C2| X*, and tia© set of 
all y whieh satisfy (2) ¥•* fbus, X is a subset of X*, and 
T is a 0iibs®t of Y** 
By means of C2)|, defia® a TSQtor, yP » (iPl), fomally 
by replaeing tb© ooaponent in, ac by (1 - ^ %) $ a e. 
•where 'M^  is tb® set M with, p delated# 'Ibat is, 
x\ m - 1 - a Mp. 
In a similar laaaner, using as tb® set K with tj deleted, 
define a Teotor, y^  * (y^ jl, by, 
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Also, l@t a s®t of aiffiifeers W « (Wp^ )^, p €. M> q e, N, 
satisfy, 
Wpt • I.* (4)^' 
Leigsa 1» I^ t z €., X*» 7 €, Y*. fh®n, 
xAy • Wp^ x^ Ajr^ * 
Proof# Mf th® ooMtPuctios gifen, wbea x €> X% e, y*, 
X « x^*, J «• « x&y« 
Tlien, 
V-
I^ maa g> M. mmBBa.Tj aad siiffiei«at eoMition that 
« p 4. (x - m)H|y • ir) (5) 
is that til© followiag rtlations liol4 for i e. M, jl €. N, 
H - (%j), Hij - aij - ajq - apj + ap,, (6) 
u " (u^ ), Uihij - - apj, (7) 
T - (Tj), hijTj - ap, - (8) 
p • - V <®' 
Proof, first, writ© omt as 
iSAya - x^ a^ pyp • (1 - Va> Vp • 
+ a - 3£^ e^ )a^ (^l - ftpFpU a ^  lp» 0 €. Nq,. 
ThnUp rearrange ttds txpreasion, wit! tJi© resiilt, 
x^Ay® * Epq^  *• '* ^^} ** ** 
+ * ®iiQ • ®^ pp * ®pq,^ p^» ®  ^ P  ^^ q_» 
It is easy to verify th@ fact that the domains of e and $ 
oan to® formally extended to iaeluid© p and t reispeotiwly, 
for ha¥iiig don® so, til© ooeffitieats ©f and beocaae 
ideatieally zero. Mow, ©oasider tlie torm, 
K • p 4 ix^  - - Tj), 
• p • 
K and x%y^  ar® polynoiaials in th# sam® Tariabl® (vaeuomsly 
in xp ana y^) and «m be Identloel If and only If their 
eoeffieiesti are etuated. l@latioM {&) t C*?)# (8), and (9) 
ar@ til® stat@a©ats of tlio®© ®qualiti®s* 
Itelations (7| and |8| do not determine Up or Their 
definitions ar® talcen to b©, 
urn « 1, m • !• (10) 
L®t th® set of all u satisfying Cl*) and flO) be U, and tb® 
set of all T satisfying (8) and flO) b@ V# 
laiffiia dim Let U -jf 0, ? 0« fben, U,. T, and p ar© all 
independent of tb® indices p and q.« In addition, 
n €. U if and only if u satisfies (10) and 
m^ (aij - a^ )^ • 0, 1 c M, J H, any fixed k €. H, (7») 
T €. T if and only if r satisfies (10) and 
(a^ j - - 0, i ^  M, J  ^S, any fixed  ^M, (8») 
and finally, 
p • uAv, ti  ^W, T €, V. (9*) 
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Proof# If (6) and (10) ar@ «s@d la (7), 
** ®PJ **" * ^ P5* 
* %q,^  * * ®pj^  " ®pq. * ®pj* 
* ®pg, * * ^pt * ®pj* 
Tliat is, 
** •» 0, i ^  M, J €,. S« 
Let J « k, any fixed ©lamtiit of 1 ami. siibtraot from above, 
U|{a|j - a|q) - H^ Hk * Hq) * "i^ i^j * Hk^  * 
lli.^  operatioas us®d ia tH© retuetioa are rsvoraible, heno© 
(?•) can b© us©4 with |6| a^ afi (10) to obtaia {7|, aad {7*1 
is thus equivalent to C7|» fom of |7*) shows that U 
is lM©p®inii«at of p aad q,# A sfiiaaetrlc argument and 
reduetioE will demonstrat® th® asaertions for ¥• 
Wh®a U 0| V 0, th© relation ^ given bj (5) exists, 
for h|^ j and p ar© polyaomial fuaotioa® of Vj and 
alwai-s exist formally# L@t x»ii€,¥, y«V€.V, Th©E, 
X €. X*, 7 c Y*, and the coaditiona of Lmm& 1 ar© satisfied. 
Using this subatitmtion, thftn, oa® obtain®, 
UAr » ,« p * in. » ii)aCv • v) »» p# 
fhis form shows that p ie iadepeadeat of p aad q,» 
By L@mjm 3, th® ©atir® depoadwe® om p and <i of the 
relation giv®a in Leiasa E is oontainod ia H». With this in 
mind, let the notation for H b® altered to Hpg^  • Chp^ j^ j), 
• "14 - «'lq - ®pj V '®'' 
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Aa inspeetloii of (6*) shows thatt 
• %Jpq • • %qpj» 
ana, as was sotti la Leiam B, 
" °* 
L#t a linear oomMnatioa of Hp^  oir®r "bb© iEtices p and q. 
with eo©ffioi@nts frca W r©®trict«d by (4j b@ written as* 
Let f b® an •arbitrary v®etor' in m& g be an arbitrary 
¥eet©r in attn, two aMitioaal typea of matrices ar® 
defined as,. 
f • 
f is a matrix of eonstant rows, wMl® CI lias constant columns. 
Lemma 4. Let 3E €. X», y ^  T*,, u ^  W, r k f, G £. CS»F,G)* Then 
(2: • ii)0(y • v) * 0# 
I»roof» When G • E, 
(x - u)l(y • t) • (®x •> m) (&y • ev), 
• (1 • II (1 « 1) 
- f0){0) • 0» 
men Q m f, th# right 2®ro faetor ©xhibited above will again 
b® 2®ro, and whm 0 « S, tli® left zero factor will again b® 
a®ro« 
Let D, 1, F, and Q b® defined as abof®, and y b® an arbitrary 
ntmb®r» fh©n. 
X6 
+ a (i3) 
10 a mppiEg of A wlileli Is a fimetS.©® ©f W, B* 
I'rltteii out, am ©ntry of B la {1$) is, 
H$ * - Htl " Y • Sji 
ami is formalizefi, as, 
B"» * f(w,r«^ '»sU «• fA, 
Call til© set of all matriets iatiifriag (13) 
Tlie reader may aot# tMt TCa} may IJ® writt©!! as tlae 
set ©f all matrie®s of tli® foim A •*• W* + &«, wher# F* and 
d-* ar® arMtrary of tb# type d®fia®d in {is)* HowT©r, th® 
argmeats of f will to® Bern mltiaately to display aertain 
efearacteristies ©f tli® matrix fA wMioM s««ta p@rtin®iit to 
tlae iavestig&tioa# For tM& reaion., tke first fommlatioa 
is ©lios«st, tiioagfe it is., admittedly,! aer® eompl©x. 
ffaeorea 1* .l^ t U 0, T -0# It u 0, JJ, r i, t, B e, JM, 
and X X*:, y c, T*., tli®a, 
3cAy »,mA¥ * (s » ii)BCy t),. (14) 
i>roc)f, Us® Ltraaa' 1-,. to 'o^ taiii, 
wkiek Qm. be writtem, by aeaas of Z and L@ima S, 
xly • WpqCp + (iE • 
•» mAT + • u|B(y «• v|.# 
By Lema 4, • f • G ©as. b© add®d TaiiiQWSly to D. Heac®, 
3£ly * uAt * fx ii]IB|y • t)# 
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Lenma. S* U 0 if aM only if tlidr© exists no t satisfying, 
At •  ©J, #t •  0, (7®) 
V 0 if aM oaly if tlj.©!*® exists so a satisfying, 
&A « ©, g® * 0» (8e) 
Proof» tJ  ^0 if aad oaly if th® ootffieient and augmented 
.matrices in relations C?»| aad (10) th© same rank. No 
linear ooaMnation of th.© right sid© of (7*) earn give th® 
riglit Sid© of 110)* a®ii©®, V 0 if aad only if ther® exists 
ao set of amabers, tj, J  ^M, sueli that, 
 ^• fi|^ )t4 • 1 for all i» 
If such a s®t of numbers do©s txidt, multiply thee® rela­
tions toy t|., and sum over k, with th# result, 
''£tm left Bid© of this is easily saea to to® zero, hene®, 
®t • 0# 
Use this faet in the first @xpr«ssion, and obtain, 
Ca^ j • • ®-iJ^ J •"*  ^
•Eh© seoond term of the ©enter member is zero, and, 
At •" ©», 
fhus, if U « 0, at exists, satisfying (7©). On th® 
other hand, l®t t exist satisfying f7®), then, 
<»13 -
and U « 0» Heme® U • 0 if and only if there exists a t 
satisfying (7®),. and th® first statement of the hemm 
follows iajmediately# A spmttri® ©rguaent holds for ¥• 
10 
aSie statement of Leama 5 giTes ©oaditions for tb® 
existeae© of the axprtssioE gi'rea ia 'a©or©m 1, . Mien A is 
squar®, • th© coMitioas reduce to tlie fact that the Bvm of 
the cofaetors of A must not be 2«ro* 
CoapariaoE with Analytic. Ixpansions 
Th® torn of ^ the ®xpr®@sio,ii ia atorea 1 suggests • a 
ooaparisoa with analytics e^ passioas of about extremal 
points in X* md ¥** 
XiQimia 6* A €. TC-A.)* In partieular, let W 9e.tistj (4)» Then, 
Proof# & typical entry of an Bleaent -of- J{A) is 
hi - ' ®pJ r ^  ti * Bp 
- a^ j + ®p*pt®i<i * 
* ^ *p#pt * 
Now Y, f, and g ar© completely arbitrary..- 'aus, for any 
fixei W, th© last thr®@ terms of th® latter expression will 
Tanish if a suitable set of definition® is taken for y» 
and g» Su©h .a set is displayed ia th© argumonts of f in the 
statement of the thaorom.. 
If the method of ILaG-rangt multipliers is used to find 
extremal points in X* and of xly, with multipliers a and 
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P, til© ©xt2?«mal points, u« and ir% satisfy ties© relations, 
ti'A • a«, u*d * lj> 
At* » p©, m* • 1# 
Let th© set of all .stieh u* "be U*, aai tli© set of all sucli 
v» toe ¥», •. If U'* ^  0, V* ^  0, tli© amalrtic ©^ Epaaiion is, 
XAy » u^Ar* * {x * n*)Aij •¥*),. c, TJ*, v* c ¥*•, .(14a) 
^Ha] -• lf(4),, ?«(A) - ?CA), 
Proof,-. .I^ t a .cU'*{A). aieii,. 
®i^ ®ij * * @ • a • 0, 2© * 1, 
tene®, 2 €, UCA)» HOW let ss «. UCa)» tli©ii (k is fixe^ li 
• %®1J • H^ ®iJ • • HHk • ®» a® • 1.> 
li@Ee®, z ^  HHA}, A sfsaetrio argumeat holds for ¥, ?•. 
It is liit#r©sting to aote tMt %h.9 mlti® of tli® multiplier, 
a, iB m-'AT*, tlie fuaetional Talue of tb® esitraaal point. 
Also hj BfmmtTj, p « a » tt«Av« » uMw • p. 
OorollagT 1* If an aaalyti® expaaeloii of th® typ® (14a) 
exists for xA^ , then tMs «x:peiisiom ii g$,wm in (14)# 
Pro-of» If Laataa 6, A €. l.©ioaa 7, U*(A) »• 1J(A), 
T*(A) - TfA). 
so 
FUMISfflffiKT, m©0, Al© mwmD 
mm  ^0 aat VfA) ^  0, A will oalled a regular 
gaat* la tM.s ehapttr, eoaeepts o,f puaisteieBt, limbo, and 
reward are„introduced for regular games# Hoaogeaeity and 
aonvexity iirineiples ar# fouad for tfees© ooaeepts •which, lead 
to sispl© criteria for eboosiag optimal strategics# Finally, 
as© is mad© of these ooae#pta to «iqpress the falue aM the 
optimal strate^  sets for any regular gam®* It ia assuaod 
for th© r@aaliid«r of tfeds ehapt®r that A is regular# 
Siaplt am® 8 
Gtrtain g,0ja®s beeoae tractabl® iiaa©dlately by means of 
til® expression in !ai®or©m 1, 
Lsmaa Bm I#@t WiA) ^ 0# Shea (&{A| > uAt, u €, "Qf(A), t €. ?{A)» 
Let WCA] 3!^  0, fh&n ^ fA) < uAt, u ^  UCa), t ^  V(A), 
Proof. By the Bain ®i@or«a, th«r9 exists a y* €. X® suoh 
that for ©T#^  IE €, X, 
Mm.) > xsy*. 
If XU{A} 0, let X * u c X, aM use Theorem 1. Then, 
A(a) > uAy* • uAv •*• (u * u}A(y® • v) * uAv, 
fhe outside members of this inequality gif© th® first 
statement. A sjmm9trie arguiaeat will show th® statement 
for tfiA). f 0, 
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gfaeorem 8, L®t MlA). 0, WCa) ^ 0, and u ^  ,ro{A), 
Y €, YT'CA). 'Hien, ACA) • UAT, ti ^ X*, T «. Y*# 
Proef# Botb stat®a©3ats of I^ aaa 8 ar@ Talid, and, 
nAf > AtA) > tiAT» ©r ACa) «• uAv, 
By Tlieorea 1,. for ®¥®ry x •£, X, y s. Y, • 
nAy •" mAf • fu • mlAly •» v) • uif, 
xAv « mAv 4- * n}Air » r) » uAt# 
Combine the last tlire® • eqwatioas and ©btaiii> 
u&s' • Ma) • xAr for every i: c. X* y e, 
fMs form deiaoBStrat©® that u €. X*, ir €, Y®* 
Qie solution found in Tli®orem 2 (where the inequality 
signs oa both, sides art deleted I 1® ©ailed a siaul® Bolutioa. 
A gam® wMoh.Ma only siiipl® solwtloss will b« called a 
siapl® gam®* fli©r® exists a pro©®dmr@ whioii will find all 
aolutioas of m arbitrary gM@, by finding simple gam«s 
deriTed from the arbitrary ga»«, la a finit© number of steps, 
fb® procedure is described la {2> pp» 27). aeitber 
player baa aa optimal strat®^  with a zero eomponeat, tb© 
game is ©all«d a ocm-pletelf lalxed mm0m 
''rh®Qr©m g» Let A b© a simple gas®» ®i©ii, X* * JIEfCA), 
Y« • Y?{A), &{A| « ttAf, a C ty(A)» T ^  TCAj, 
Proof* .By tb© definition of a siagsle gam®, and tb® I&in 
Theorem, thj@r# exist- X®, X® sueh that if x® €. X®, y®  ^X®, 
£3 
foi? mwrj X, F c, T, 
i£®A3r « AiA) « Mr®. 
la partiettiat, tMs must toM'wktii s ami y. aM unit TOeters# 
Wittm in ©©m^ oiieiit the r«jta1sl.oii b©o©a@0, 
Btit» a» a®moBSti^ at#i la laaaa f, ttes© ar@ ©fttifalent 
definlMdms to If*) sat f®*| f©T "U aa4 ?• lean®, x®  ^
y®  ^?Ca|. • ills©, X® 'C Xf F® •••^ * maaas tliat 
X® €. 'IHCaI,, y®'€. W|A|. By^  til® aaiii adofea, aa x® aad ;f® 
exist, &ea©#,, BICA) 0, IffAl # 0» fMea S applies^  
6H€ t&0 eati» stat©a@at ©f tto© ttoorta follc^ s iiimediat@lF» 
W^itli t&e ait of tlie ©Qseepta ©f jptmiateaeat, limbO'., ant 
reward > It will b@ @aaj to s©# that a ®o«pi®t©ly mimi. gam# 
is i. simplii .^ s« with mlg.ii® is its W aai f t 
jiirtifi#ia3, 'Qmm.& 
Artlfieial gaiMS ta this seetion in order 
to stttdr tli« strtiettif® of aoa-sispX# gases mere #xt@iisiT®ly« 
fli© i®fiiii%i©a -©f itiiih m &thi%mTf gas® is suggested by a 
g®B#iraiisati€«i of tli® Maim !Si#o2»«a* 
Let M fe© an srMts»a:i7 s fey a mtrix, amd eoasia@r tM 
tTmmt^ Tsmtimf 
z » xM, 1£ c. X* 
8.3 
ls% s©t ©f all au,©hi z Is© XCmI# Slfflilarly, wlieia S Is an 
arbitrary H j a aatrix., let <»f all a* by, 
. • ly, r ^  
h® ¥ClK X(M} md I(M} ar# ©©aw* lifp©r-polyli@ara of 
•dimeiisians aot m©r@ ttoai tlielr g«ft«&t.or8, X anfl ¥. 
Leima §* Let A b@ arbitrary, x liaw dtnaia XCM), y li-aw 
doaaia Y{MK 'Hi®!!, 
M&Xj&tLJCMS' • MilLj&E-Xily.# 
Proof, L®t i:* feav© toiiaia X, y« liaT®' 4«ain If., B » IIM« 
flien, apply Property 3C t<J a, x*, y* te obtain, 
MM^ aiyUiy - Max^ ,Hlny,i-aAMy<. 
« MiByf^ x^ tx*By% 
for t&@ preseat |>ttrpcjst, M m& H *111 be taken suoto 
tliat X is'a subset ©f ZfM), ast t is a subset of YiM)* 
%^ ii, H and N must tm .aoa^ singyilar, 6»a satisfy, 
11© • ©, @M «• «» 
Til© .©ntir© proo@®tiiig mm b® r.©gar&®d in two ways# First, 
til® players tetep tlieir strategy s«tg, X aiii T, but play a 
new gaa®, 1 « lAH, C3tto.®rwis®, ths play@rs alter tlieir 
strategy sets to X(M) aad T(l|, aai play thm original gam®. 
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A, 0¥er til® um strategy sets# 'Siis oliaptw uses %tm latter 
point of iri@w^  aloag witli ©onditioa® oa M aM N. 
I.®t M to# s«.efa tliat 2 is a sttfes®t of X(M), but oth,®rwis® 
arbitrary, l^ t H « I, tli© id©atity matria:# fli®n y{l] «• Y. 
Gall 8u§li an arbitrary gaa® AiM} > amd regard tli® gam® from 
tue point Of Tiew of P,. Py Is r«tPloted to y. but P, to0 
til® additional freedom of XCM)» Aa ®xaaiaabioa of tii© gaa© 
A(M) 0aa be iiat®, and aethods iii¥«®tigat@d by wMcli caa 
redmee strategy ehoiees f^ oii X(M) to X with miniiam lost. 
In a syaaetrio way., a gaa®, 4(1),is d«fia@d wb.®r® 
M « 2, and Y is, a smbstt of HS) • fi®r®,, the additional ' 
freedom Is girea to Py., and AlH) b«©®a®s a tool for th.® 
iiiv®stigatioa of A by 
¥Ch®s Fjg seleets aa i: ^  3C(M) !&• aCM) , th® least favorable 
payoff will oeour wiiea F s®l©ets «t jf® c Y suoJa that, y 
xA^  « * y^ iz) • 
wlsh®s to maximlge the payoff, aad will try to oboose an 
XCM) sueb that. 
Mayfly • Max^ nyXA^ m 
If X® C X, m optiaal strategy for A lias b@®a found. 
If 3^  if X, %hm aast c-liaRg® Ma strategy wli®ii playing At 
It turaa out tbat certain erlterla ©an be @®tablisb©d in 
aakiag t.b® ©Mage frcs® XCl) to X» 
fb® proceeding ia 1(S) is similar, except that 
wishes to lainimiz:® that payoff ratli®.r than laaxiiniz® it. 
GI 
L®t % c. XCmJ,| y £. u 4 1SiA)f v s. ?Ca), flieu, 
liiiijPLiy • i^ jiyCuiT {x •• n)Aif - THi 
«  m i - T  * *» ujAij *  y | ,  
• UAV + MIX),  ^
WH®RA,. 
afx) « • u)Aij *¥),!:•€. XCM), y e. 1. C15) 
Als©, let X €. K, y £. TC®lt ^ ^  ^ |a|, w  c. flieii, 
^DE^XAY » liBX^ itiAr + |X • TA)ACY -
» uAt 4- ifca^Cx - ti)A(y • t)#. 
uAr a|y), 
irher© (aot® ainmi- slgtil, 
n{y) • • llai^lx u}Aij - t),-X •^, X, y ^  YCH). {16) 
win wish to salect z to mxlmlze m(x). for tUs „1U 
maximlz® MljyKAy# will also- wmt t# aaxiaiz® a{y), for 
tMs will aimi®l25© Haa^xAy# ®i® us® of til® minua si^a in 
{16| makd® tlie Sssires of tke play#r# witl regard to their 
re8p©eti¥@ fmotioiis, mixl ant sCyl, iientieal# By tMB 
means I tton,, a eoapletBly spmetrieal i®soriptioa of th® 
©riteria for %he twd players will to® posslbl®* Mote tliat th® 
operators MiSy. are dtfinei wer X, T resp®otiT©ly, 
Definition 1* If miz) <•© or nCy) < 0,, x or y is a point 
TOniahaeiit.* If mix) * 0 or aCy) » 0, x or y is a point 
MSE* ^ ^ ^ X or y is a point 
of reyari* 
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Let P t>© tHe s@t -Of all points of paaialinent for either 
player, L b® the set of all points of limbo, and R the set 
of all points of reward# Then for for ©xampl©, 
P + L + B « X{M), m m • RP • 0. 
Let P(p|, a sttbs©t of P, be the 8#t of all points with a 
pnaisha©nt not aor® than p, and iCp), a subsst of th© 
s®t of all points with a rowart not less than p» fake p > 0 
always in either eas«» fh©n for say, 
y €, PCp) iaplits • P < h{y) < 0, 
y c. L implies n{y) « 0, 
y €. H(p) implies nCy) > P > 0. 
Homogeneity anA Convexity in 
Punishment, Limbo, ant Sewarfi 
If X is r©wpitt®n aa M -t- Cx * u|, it is easily seen that 
N FIX -» M), Y > 0 
is a half*ray with its origin at u In th© dlreetion ix - n)• 
fhe half-ray does not ©ontain the origin, u# Vlhen y < 1, 
a particular Tain®, a point ia represented by th® ©xproasion 
whloh lies between w and x*> If y > i» a parti'milar Talne, 
th® point li@s b©yond i: frm u» 
Similarly, the ©x^presslon, 
T • YLY T), R > 
is a half-ray with th© saa© ©onnotation as deaeribed above. 
L^ E.OYEM 4* Lmt X < KM), u c Y > 0• TH©H| 
miu * fix *>%))** ifmin • (a: •• uH « y^(x), (17) 
LET R C TCH) > ¥  ^ T, R > »^ 
NFV + YIL - TI ) » Y&IR • (F * I «» YU^Y) • (18) 
Proof. Bj (1§), y ^  Y, aEt# 
ii(u • y|x - ml) • lUiiyCii yIx •• ti) • ta)A(y - v) 
• LILJOYFLX * M)A(Y * "T), 
«» YJ'^ S^Y(X • W)A{Y * F), 
• Y^CX) * ymim. • (X • U)) • 
file secoM stat#ia@nt follows a similar arguaeat using (16)» 
Corollary 8« IIX(ll) is a subset of YliM) is a subset of L» 
I^oof* Let f » 0 in. fii®or@m 4# Hien aCw) • -O* A similar 
argwaent holts for Tl" ('l")» 
®ioor« 4 ©stablis^ea tJ ant T as «@nt®r@ of licaiogeiieity 
la ptmialEQeat, liabOj aai rew&ri* By Sorollary 2, U ant ? 
tii®ms®lTes eoatain. only limbo poiats# If my point of a 
telf-ray itos tto property of pti®dato#»t', limbo, or reward, 
ttiea ©very point of tb© lialf-ray Jtos the 8m& property. Both 
til® ptiais3m«nt ant th© rowart inerdas# as tb® point moves 
away from tb# origin of tbe balf^oray, u or v» From th© 
point of rim of eitler player, tb® pttnislsitnt sbouM b© 
miniailaot, aat tbe r©wart aaalaig«fi» If a plmy#r is r®quired 
to ©booa# a strat®gy from a balf-ray witb origin u or v, 
m 
'Mieomm 4 mskmrn thm ciioiee easy Qm* Siao® p^lnt 
of a km tM ssa# paroftrt^# tto teXf-ray aay be 
r©fe3?r©t I0 as a pual.ato@at» liafeOj oy rtward half-ray# 
Critepiea ,1> a plaF©?*® ©toie® of strategy fee r©atiriot#t 
tO' a elosei siibs'tt of m balf-'^mF -witli ori.gia « or v» 
On a pmialffi©at lialt-rar, tii« playsr sliould select tli® 
STRAT®  ^ N®AI»®ST u m T. 
On a llateo tM® flayer ajay .i-©l®et may strategy 
of tb© SMbstt* 
On a rew&rt lialf-riiy, tlie pX&wm should seleet tli# 
strategy farthest from n qt w*. 
la ptrtiemiaff, tlili eriterioa #aa u»©i la applying 
A{M) or A{S| to A fey eoasifieriiig tto iRt©i*s®©tiaii ot a gXmn 
Mlf-ray with 1 03? Y# It % ^  X m-r i T, t:fe© iaterseetlou 
will to© olo-s«a», aad tli© m'-iterioa will b« ralid. 
Polat® of a 0ti"b8®t Qt m m& fea 4#sorlMa la terms 
of a flaeet s«t of'Wetors witli orlgitts ti or f* For iESteao©, 
eoasii©r the •i^s^lptioa ot 1: ^ X ta tSi® followlag way* 
Wrl%« tfee-mit wetors ©f m fliea, 
X «• X|_©^ * t* + * ml •• u • » mU 
fr« a pra#tieal staadpoiat, tM,s fl»€ set M b  adirantages In 
tliat all emtfiMiwutB. {t&e ac^l mm posltiTo» aaft tMat th# 
property of ©men kalf-ray 1e t&t 9«t is m^y to eal©wl,at®* 
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ILeama 10-. x ^  X(M), z* ^ 2|M), Q <a <U ISxen, 
ia(ax (1 • > eafx) + {1 • a)iaCa£*) » (19) 
Let y ^ Yd), y* 4 YCH) , 0 < a < !• mm, 
lilay + (1 - a|y*) > anCy) Cl • a)E(y')» 
Proof. The proof of {19) will laak© use of {15), and th© 
inequality, 
Min^lfCy) * g{y)) >. I4iayf:{y) 4- i!lEyg(y)« 
TJslog these, one obtains, 
a{a2E * (1 • a)x*) « Winjimx •«' {1 •• ulx* • u)A{y • 'r), 
« Mny{e{x * «.)A{y • v) 
+ |l • a) fx* - u)A(y • v)), 
^ Mn^ix * n)A{y • r) 
* MlHyCl «x) (x* • m)A{y - t) 
> aMiftyCi: • m)A{y.» t) 
* iX * • tt)A(y - t), 
> miix) # {1 •• a)m(x')» 
Tim fltat«i©Bt of {20) Can b© sliom similarly. It turns •out 
tliat til® oparator - iSBX^ gives tli® inequality in th© saia® 
direction as Mi3Gy# Tliat is, 
* Max^itix) G{X)) > {- + {• llB.XjSix))^ 
By aeans of tMs lemaa, the following two theorms 
oliaraet®ri2e tbe sets, R{p) ami P{p)« oosditions for 
th& eteraeterizatioa of P{p) aay s@®a ©sp@eially stringent, 
but later results will support tli®a« 
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l(p| Is eonTtx# 
Proof. tm% X €. Hfp), X* HCp), 0 < ci < 1# Sioa It must b® 
SHOWN THAT AX • (I ALX* « X** €. HCP)* LEIMA 12, LLIEEI 
a(ai: • {1 • a}x*} ,> amM {1 - a)mCx*), 
> ap * Cl • • p > 0# 
H©iic®» x"' €.,lCp) aM l(p) is mmmx* 
fheoreaa 6m I.«t Z be a mww%x sttbaet of X* or T% and in 
addition, l®t ZP » 2» fii#n, ZP{pJ is oonTsx. 
Proof# L®t X €, 2P(p), X* €, EP(p)| 0<a. <1» Tk&n it aust 
be shown that <xx + (1 - a)x* « x" €. 2P{p|. tJs® tli# convexity 
of Z:f 2P • E, and Leaote 12# Tli®a,|, 
0 > LACAX • (1 • ALX*) > AMCX) •<• {1 - A)A{X*) 
> • ap * Cl • g)p « • p» 
H®ao«,, x** €. ZF{p|, and 2!P{p| is eonirex. 
Consider th@ s®t of all points.wit^ reward exactly p. 
By Tlitoreis 5, this sat is eontaiafd in a ©onrox set# 
Consider one snob, point and by eoabining tli® statements of 
fli®or«a 4 and Corollary 1® notice t&at the point is not an 
©leaoat of C or ?, tone© thm® exists a balf-ray iiith origin 
u or V ttoougb. the point j then ©Tsry noigiiborliood of this 
point contains a point of tiio half-'ray not in R{p), that is, 
OTory nei^bortoood of a point witli remrd exactly p contains 
points not in HCpl# "Ttas, the s@t of, all points with reward 
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ezaolily p lies oa boundary of l(p)» On the other hand, 
if a polat lias reward different from p,, aay tills point 
lies on the boundary of !{!'), ant Is © finite iistan©:© aloag 
a tolf-'ray froa u or T from tlit bo«a€ary of RCp)* lli® 
bouiiiary of l(p) eaimot li© aloag & telf-ray for a finite 
aistano®, heao®, tlie #®t of points with reward exactly p is 
the boundary of tli@ comm set If.p)# Similarly, the 8®t of 
all points of pmisteeat eaotly p is t^© boundary of P{p), 
•and iaad©r tb© eonditioas of aaorm 6, ia th.® boundary of 
a coaTex set. 
L®t ooasidtr all sets of ©q,«l*r©ward or ®q.ui-JH 
ptmishiEfint points in A{M|» la wMeb is supposed to 
©ontain X, tlies© s®ts my intereeet X or not, depending on 
tlie laagnitud® of tli© punishaent or reward. In Tiew of 
Criterion 1, it is.wisbtd to sel®©t a strategy in X in 
sueli a way ttot ®v#ry aeigliborhood of the 0trategy contains 
points not in X, On tto otiier tmxA, if sueb a strategy i® 
selected, and oth.©r points of its #q.mi-r«ward or ©tui-
punisl»a®nt s«t h&WB n@i#iborliood0 ©ontaintd completely in 
X, then "Bieorea 4 says a greater rewrd or a less punish­
ment can b® obtained along a ray throu^ u and the point, 
Henoe, should find a set, S(p) or P{p| whioh has a non-
mpty interseotion with X, but whieh has no point \vith a 
neighborhood eoataiaed entirely in X» fhis set is, then, 
tangent to X • If the conditions of fheorem 6 hold, the 
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iiit©3?seetioii of til® sets In «ltli©r ©ase will fe® coair®x# 
Sriterioa let oitli©r play« l&® i»©t«ir®A to seieot a 
strategy fr«,a eoavex. stifeset of X or T respeetivelji wiiiok 
ooKtaias eltlier only points of pwmlsteeait or oaly points 
of reward, fti©a, tii@ player skoaM s«leet a strategy from 
tte eoa^ex smtett of X or T wiiiok li®s. la tii® Qom&z s©t 
of taagemey te«tw©ett a,s#t of et^l*reisiri or ®tmi*pimishia®iit 
aafi th.© giwm subset» 
fJi© coapl#t®ly sixo'i gas® ©aa to® iisposei of at tliis 
tim®» Smppos® A is ©ompl®t®lj mixet.# Tlieii ao optimal 
strategy for ©itlier playor h&s a mm^omntp l»e«: no 
optimal strategy lies o» tli© feoiiadary of X or T» TMi meaas 
tli© optiaal strateglos ar®' aot eiiosen froa a punisfament 
i©t or a r«wari e®tj liea©# tli-ey amst fee ©bo#®a from liabo 
sots of t!i© two playors# But tliii«« optimal stratogies 
caimot be okoseii .fro® t liabo lialf-»rayi for otliorwlse 
Criterion 1 aays points oa tk® boma€iirios of 2 and X would 
also be optimal* fhiis, tli® points mst b© cMosea from U 
aat f, ..Again, U aad ? aust ®aek haf© a miqu® element, for 
otlierwla®, ISieorea 2 says point® on the. boundary would b® 
optimal# Heue®, tlia ttBlttt© ©leaoats u €. tTfA), r s, ¥(1) ar© 
optimal stratogios, and th© gas# is siapl®. 
m 
Solutions for Ragular Gomes 
SSi® pmlsJiaeat, liabo, and r«wart s@ts feelonging to 
t.li© two players stem from two different consideration® of 
til© same iiatris:, .A« Some of tli® iEt©rdep«mi®iio@s iiiTolir©d 
is tliia ar© 4«mo.iistrat®i hera#. 
Lmmm 11* Let tke doaala of x be X, the domain of j b© Y# 
Thm, 
B?oof, Vs© will b© ma<le of (30), aii4 the identity, 
te3^(x) « * lliia^i* W{x) I, 
wMcli can b@ ferifiei. on inspeotioa# leeall, in (IS), (16), 
til© variable killed by or iiad tOBiain X or Y# 
msL^ lx) • MAI:^ {FLIIYS:^  - UAF), 
• • MLT, 
« Mliiy(ulv » a(y)) - iiAt, 
» n&v • n(y)) • iiAv, 
» - LFEXYJI(R]L» 
Isimm18, M 0 if m& only if IS» - Y. 
IH / 0 If and oaly if XP « X, 
Proof# It IM. ^  Of thm iMx^ ix) >0, x: €. X, and by Lesma 
11, <0, y •€. Y, • ii©ii«@, Y 0oatains only points of 
punistoaent, aa4 YP «• Y# 
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Oa th® other haad, if IT » T, I ooataias oniy points of 
pimisbment, am4 <0,. j €, 1» By Lemma 11 tlien, 
Max^ix) > P, i; €. X, XS 0* fh® seoond statement 
follows, a simaeti'le argaiaeat. 
Leaaaa lg«. •• SI • 0 and Hi • 0 if -and onlj if .XL / 0 and IX ji* 0» 
Proof,. Let XI « -0 and IB » 0. IL ^  0 qt XP * X» fh® 
latter ease'Is iapossiblt, • foi* if tfu«,. Y& f 0, bjr Leima 12| 
Tiolating til© liypotliesls, ii©a@®, XL 0, By iateroimnging 
X and Y la ttoe argmtBt, It ^  Q also. 
L@t XL G and XL 0* flita II - 0 or X8 ^  0. Th® 
latter ease is iapoEsil^le, for if tru®, Ii> •« Y, and IX >» 0, 
violating th® &;njot&esls. Eenoe IR « 0, It follows, by 
iiiterebaaging X and f, tliat H « 0 also# 
Theorem M w&t j  regular gas® ie in. om and onlj on® of tii® 
tlire® Glasses d.efia®d tb® eoatitions btlow, 
A. IH • 0 AND H * 0» • 
B* H 0. 
e, IB 0, 
In additioEi equivaleat ©onditions for A, B, and C, 
respectively,, are given la Laima IS and Lesaaa IS., 
Prooft A, B.| and 0 ©xMmst all poe®lMliti®s ©xo©pt XH 0 
a»d JR ^ 0, wM-cli is impossibl® by L®Mia 12•. Hsao®, tliey 
©xliaiist all regular gaaes, 1!li®ir mutual exclusiveness caa 
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b© seen immadiately by forms of th® eoaditioaa, Henee, 
©very regular gaae must t>« in. on© aM only oa@ of the elasses. 
Classes B and C are essentially th® semm typ# idtli an inter-
oMng© of playsrs.. If XI / 0, ttten, hf Leima 12, TP » T» 
L®t Y b© th.© oonvax set in tli© eoatltioaa of Theorem 6, 
Then, 2H{p) and TPfp) ar@ tooth, ©onvex sets# By Criterion S, 
each of th® play®rs should s©l©©t a strategy fro® th© 
set of tangeacy betweaa 2 or Y and th® ®q,tii*r®war4' or equi-
punislm®3at set tmgmnt to X or T* liet the reward on the 
equi-reward set be p®. ai©», by Lena® 11, th© paaisteitnt 
on the et^l-puniahaent s®t is also p®» 
fheorem 8« Let A b@ regular, ^ U{A), t ?Ca) , p® th© 
reward of aa ©qui-reward a®t tmgmt to X or Y* Then, ©aoh 
of th® ©xhaiistiv®, but atitwally exelmsiT®, ©lasses, given 
in 'Hieorem 7, have values and solutions as giveja below# 
A, If XI • 0 and IS » 0, then ACA) • uAv, 
X® « XL, T® « YL, 
B,. If XE 0, thea M a) « uAv • p®, 
X® « XH{p®), Y® « YP(p®). 
C,. If IH 0, then A(A) * uAv p®, 
X® « IP{p®), Y® • IR{p®). 
Proof#. A«, L®t XR » 0 aM 'YH " 0# llieii XL 0 and YL ji^ 0» 
Let x® f, XL., y® i, IL, th®a, for tvery i: •£. X, y €. Y> 
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X®IK3R > 
xAy® < Wsm^ KAj* » uAr * nfy®) »» uAT. 
Gombin© these inequalltie®, with, the result, 
X:®A3R > vlAY > XAY® J 
will oh displays statement A* 
B. I^ t X®  ^xa|p®|, y« p. IP'Cp®}- Tliea, for ewry 
ac X, y f. t, 
x®Ay > Mliiy3E®ily « uAv * m{x^\ > uAw + p®, 
XAY® < MA:^ XAY® « UAT *> NCY®) < UAT + P®. 
That is, 
x®Ay ^  sAf • p® > xAy®, 
wMoli displays ®tat@is@iit B# 
G, iMt 3c® €, XP(p®), y® ^ IB(p®)« TMen, for ©very 
X e, X, y €. Y, 
x®Ay > Mijyc®Ay • uAt • m(x®) > uAt - p®, 
xAy® < Maa^xiy® « u&w • »(y®) < uAt • p®. 
That is, 
X®AY > IIAT -»'P® > ZAY®, 
which displays stataiaent C» 
3f 
AM IQUITALEMOB BlMflOH .FOM ALL QMSEB 
The operator, T(W|y,f»g}, glT@a ia (13| is definei for 
an arbitrary gamej A# It will b© shown In-tMa chapter that 
T divides all games of a givan sig© into a®ts of gam®® whieh 
are eq-uivalent in a eertaiii •senae. Sm® of th® invariants 
of these classes of equiv 'alent gamea ar® lii¥©stigat®d.. In 
addition, th© structural relationship between regular and 
irregular games is stmiied, 
Iquifalenoe of A and TA 
Hecall from (13) that, 
B *» TA *» • B • yl +. f • 0 
means that, 
»14 - - Spj • ®P<1> • r + fi + gj. 
wh®r®, ©pqWp^ • 1, ant T*%»€j are eoittpl@t©ly arbitrary, 
Th© operator fCW%y»,f'%§•) will b« written f*, and siiailarly 
T" ©to. If th® operation is iterated, say Tf*A, a typicail 
entry of this element is 
*PQ(^ *RS^®LJ * H b  *  4- Y* *^I G*J 
- W'YGCA^Q - ©18 •» %<| %SL • Y» • F*| -
- •^*rsC®pJ - aps - %j ^ %s^ - r* -f'p -
• + W'RS^^ PQ • %S ~ ®RT ®RS '^ + F* *^P * S*q) 
* r •*• 
whieh reduces to, 
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- ®14 - • ®p<i' • T + fl • gj. 
an entry of TAm fMt is, 
fT*A • m* (21) 
Definition 2m It for T, B « fA, 4®not© th© rtXatioa 
between B and A by B r A* 
Theorem B r A is an ©quiTaien©® relation# 
Proof# B©flexivity, syiaawtry, and transitifity must b© 
shoirai for B r A. 
R®fl®xi¥ity# I©t T b® s@leet©d by a©ans of Lerama 6 in 
suoh. a way that TA * A* Theii, A r A# 
Symmetry# I^et B r A, then B * TA. Select f» sueh that 
T*A « A, ani us© (SI), , Biea, 
A - f»A « T*TA -
h®no®, A r B» 
Transitivity* i:.©t C r B, B r A, then, 0 - TB, B « f«l, 
ChooB® T" such that « A» l&en, 
A « f'A • f"f»A • T"B •« T"2® « f'«0, 
henoe, A r C» 
Let a set of gaaes of th® saa# size be given, say A, A*, 
A",».., 1?h®n, by {21}, a fixed f will classify these games 
by the alternatiTes fA • fA* or TA fA'# la the first case, 
A and A* are in the saae eqttiTalenee set, 
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latter ease, A and A* ar© not la tlie saa® eqmiTalene© set. 
On th® other hiand, toy Leauam §, an arbitrary game lias, a . 
representation, A « Tli for some f. Hene©, all gaaes' ar@ 
divided into classes, of games wbere all gaa©s of a • single 
olass are ©(juivaleBt la tli® sense of Definition S.* 
'Phe relation between regular and irregular games is 
taken up now^ and ultiaat®ly finds eliaracterization in the 
arguments of T, lat a f, X*,,- b c Y* bereaft©r» 
Lema 14* Let A be arbitrary# flien tb.®re ®xists,aad ean b® 
eonstruoted,, + G wlileJi is regular..# 
Proof. By Lema S, UCB) / O if and' only if tMr© exists no 
t ifhieh satisfies, 
{A + F + Q)t • ®, @t • 0, 
Let k b© fixed, and d©fin« g by the relation, 
gj w 1 - for all J, 
l@t' I b© fixed, and define f by th# relation, 
f « i • for all i» 
Suppose a s®t of t ©xi.i3ts for whieli ©t » 0# Sien, 
(aij + fi • gj)tj » a^jtj + ©jtj - aj^jtj - 1., 
If et • 0, tWs reduces to, 
aj^jtj - * 1 for all i# 
Tills i.s olearly impossibl« wlita 1 *« k, for th® left sl-d® is 
then zero. In a similar way, th# definition of f will 
guarantee tbat y(B) ^  0. 
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Tlieorem 10., Let A b© ^ €. fiA)^ 'Biett, 
A • T(llp^ .^,mA¥,0,0)A* 
Proof, Secall the ooEstnictloB of A in 6.| aM let 
WPQ 
« UAV,AI,^ V ,^TTPAPJ|A, 
But toy Leoma 7, tlm veetors in th© last two arguraeats ar# 
uAr for all i or J, lieae©,, 
A •• UATIUAWJTTAFELA, 
• B - UATI * UATL 4- MATL, 
« D + iitorl, 
• F(U|^ ¥|,TIAT»0,0)A, 
Corollary S« I^t T » fCa|,te|,Y»Of^) • fli©a# a UCfAl, 
b ^ V(TA), Y * aTAb# COoaaettteatlj, TA is r®g<ilar.) 
Proof, Substltut® a into wltli tk@ result, 
AJ^ CFTPCAIJ - • r 
• AP(A|^  «• - SPI^  + AP^ |B^  - Y) • » 0, 
wMch r®<itt@®s to, 
®i^Hj - Hk^ - • %'k) * 
Both teraa '>si th© left ar« Identleal, heme a €. UffA), 'Hi® 
asaertion for b can b© T#rifl®i la a similar way,, aad fA 
is regular. Then using {£1|, fA «• fTA, .one aaa appl:^  
flieorem 10« 
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Corollary 4* Let A 1)© arMtrarj* Tliea, A ean bo written, 
A •• fCu|_TjpUBT,f,g)A, u C U(B), r €. ?{B), 
whore B, f and g are t®fin#d in L®iraa 14, 
Proof, Us© Leiiiiia 14 m& ISitoroa 10,^ 
Invariants of J (A) 
Coiisider tb© following relations, 
(aij - * 0| fo®* all i, a fixed k, 
®lU®i - 0, ©jT®j • 0, 
and let the set of all m® satisfying tli®e@ relations fe® U®, 
th© set of all such t® be V®, 
fhoorea 11. tS^(TA) • U«{Ah 
Proof. tJ®CTA) is d.©fia©a bj th« following relations, 
"^L<*PQCAIJ - HQ •  ^ R * SJ 
- WPQCAJ^ LJ. * A^Q - APJ^  4- AP )^ •• Y * % " 
The last two terms ar© 3B«ro by definition of u®, anfl 
- ®LK> • 0* 
Hene®, ti® e, tJ®CA)« 'a« r^teotioa is ro^orsibl#, heno®, th® 
firat assertion is true# A syaaetric argumont will 
demonstrat© th© soeoM statement» 
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Corollary. 5^ €. U®{A), f® T®(A|, T - f|a|^ b|,r»0»0)• 
Then, a * u® « m €. TlifA}^ !>•¥*»¥€. ¥|fA|» 
Proof, Botli a asd u® satisfi' tto© hamgrnnmm relatio.iis C?*)' 
and tlieir sum will lilcewisit satisfy tM relatioas# .Alio, 
©Ca + u®) « 1 + 0 » 1, so u satisfi#© ClO]» A symaetri© 
BTgimmt will proT© tli# a»s»rtioii for V. 
It may oeetir to tli© readtr tliat as extension. of the 
Bqniv&X&nc® elassificatioaiUy dropping tto r@ciiiiraiii@»t tbat 
W - 1 ^ effected, in partlouiar, aeor» 9 and 
Thoorea 11 do not seed tli« restrietion,- In fast,, tlie ©atire 
function of tli© restrletioia is to guaraat©© tbat th.© ©xpansloa 
itfill represent tii© original xAf, &n& not a raultipl© of xAy.. 
In place of tMs ©xtenaloii, tl©' reader is r©ft»ed to tli® 
concepts in i^opcrty 3Bt 
la Ti@w of til® faets noted pravioaslj, aaraely, 
T{fA) Cr'®CfA) - H^lAh • V®CA), 
non© of th®s@ sets dtpead oa. A. ®.xplioitly, ex©#pt that A 
has generated a class of o.l#a®ats, TA* Let an index, TT, 
be assipied to ©ach elass,. and writ©, 
T * T(")F * II® CW), •« • 
Ttos, for a giT®n ti, tli®r« is a s®t of games, or laatrices, 
and a subspaeO' of eaeli mad in corr«spoiideao©« Bf 
means of tb® results abov®, any regular gam® ©am h@ 
expanded, as a fraction of 'W f. 
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Theorem 18# Let ti® ^ f, A ^ JCw}, 
T » f(a b JYJOJO), a©a, .for z s, X\ y €, !», 
x1?Ay « Y + (a: • a • • b * t®)* 
Proof, fA is regular toy Corollary 3# 'The values of p, u, 
and T in 'Iheorem 1 ar© gives in Corollary 3 and -Corollary 5«. 
I^us til© expaa^ioa of ©very regular gam© ia a function 
of It and Tm X effect of translating the value of the 
gam®, hut alters the strategy ooasiteration® not at all, Bie 
essential character of all regular games in a class is then 
contained in th® subset defined by T • f{a|_bj,,0,0,0) • 
Gall this subset 
gheor@m 13* Every element of T®Ctt| has the same rank# 
Proof, Let A. be of'ainlaiia rant in say of rank r» 
I'hen, an entry of A ©an be written, 
®IJ * %K^KJ  ^ ** IF•##!*. 
An entry of B «. is. 
Mow, B cannot be less than rank r, for otherwise A is not of 
minimum rank. On the other hanS, B cannot be of rank more 
than r, by reason of th® form tisplayed above. Hence B is 
of rank exactly r, and B is a typical element of 
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Corollary fe. Let tfe© aiatmiBi rank in be r# fhen, 
every eloaent of jivi) is of rank r,. r + 1, or r a, not 
©xeeeding M.n{ai,n), and ©vtry regular eleaent of TC^I 
of rank r or r + 1* In 6dditio|i» , 
r < 
Proof. Any ©loiaent. of ®8tn be expressed by' the laetiiod 
in Theorem IS as,,, for a typioal entry,, 
I^J." S'I#*3£J + R • % *-El » ^ 
Mow Y ®an b© absorbed la f or g,. sin©® botli ar® arbitrary# 
Hence,any element is of rank at Most r g. If B is. 
regular, it liaa^ a representation with f • 0, g • • 0, and 
hence, is of rank at most r • 1» for the last assertion, 
consider defined in wMch is an eleraent of T®Ctt), 
and lias a zero row and a zero coltiiia.t 
3-mm Special Glasses 
Elements and properties of some special set® are 
displayed her® to illustrate the analysis above, 
Y(l), where the matrix 1 is taken as the index, is the 
set of all games with the typical entry, 
®14 - -1-1 + 1) * r * * Bj. 
that is, 
. A - f + G, 
where y® absorbed., into the arbitrary I and G. 
m 
contaias oalf OB© ©lemeat, the matrix 0, ami, 
« X«,  «  Y*.  
Tiie set of all regular gaaea of the class is yS, and tke 
set of all irregular gait@a is f ^  wber© f a® or g p©» 
'Bie ainimma raalc is zero, all regular eleatents are of raalc 
zero or on®, and. the irregular elements are. of rank one or 
two. 
X{I), where I I0 the iientltf matrix (stpar®), is th© 
set of all gam®8 with th© typioal entry, lAer© I •» 
AIJ • - hq • P^,| : 
« dj|_j - • aj • al> • y f|, + gj# 
That is, 
A • 1 • P •I' <1, 
X®{I) contains all gas®a of th® fona, 
B • I • F® - G« 4. f®g®l, 
where f® X*, g® €, ¥•• Si# spaces associated with I ar© 
th© zero vectors, written as, 
U®CL) » CO), - CO). 
I ft T*CI), ana is traaslatst hj f • l/n fr<» th® gam®, 
The' minimum rank is a •» 1,. which demonstrates the attainment 
of the mexiaiia giir©n in the tooiiai of Corollary 6# 
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MlfHODS iffiD G01J10TO81S 
METHODS 
Consider the gam© (B, p« 69}, 
A » 
1 - 2 0 
«. 3 1 0 
0 0 la 
This game is regular». and the suhspaces associated with its 
class are th© zero Teotors, lliat is, U® «• {0), ¥® «• C0)» 
Then, there is a unlciu© n or r, TMj turn omt to toe, on 
calculation by {?*), (8»), and ClO)# 
u « v " (lS/g3, lS/23, • 1/23), uAt • -• 12/23# 
It is easj to see that, 
ATA|_MINJ A|_J « 0, 
and, since 
uAv 4- m(z) * B.lin^Ay, 
UAV + MAXJ^ TX) » LLAXJGLINYXAY > LLAXJ^ MINJA|_J « 0* 
fhat is, 
> • uAr » lS/23, 
hence, .KS ^ 0, and by •Lesiia 12, Ft « T* 
•Consider the cone giren by, x • u + y{% • u.), where 
25 « (a, 1 • a, 0}# By fheorem 4, ii(x) • ^laCss). X is a 
subset of this eon® when 0 < a <1, and y ^  ^ 
points of X, 
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Bj definition, 
a(z) » Mn^zAy - uAr, 
« ianC3a * -34/23., 35/23 - 3a, 12/23 K 
'Kiat is, 
miz) « Sa - 54/23 when a < 1/2, 
m(z) « 35/B'S • 3a when a > 1/2# 
The punishment, limbo, and reward s©ts can then h® 
seen by comparing itt(z) with zero* IMs gi¥@s, 
2 £. P when ft < 54/69 and a > 35/69, 
2 c, I. when <&. * 34/69 and e » 35/69, 
z e, 1 when 34/S9 < a < 35/69 • 
The homogeneity of punislmeiit, limho, and reward makes it 
easy to see that these set® are ©ones with Tertioes at u* 
The limho half-rays separate th© punishment and reward sets, 
and serve as asymptotes for ©tni-reward or ©tui-punishmsnt 
onrires in the plan® X** By th© s|iaa®try, it is apparent 
that the point of tangeney between X and an ©qni-reward 
set will be along th© half-ray defined toy a » 1/S, out from 
u as far as possible, nOT«ly to (0, 0, 1). I'hen, 
MAX^ (X) » 12/SS • P®» 
•Thus, (0, 0, 1} is optimal, and A • uAy  * p* « 0# 
Let y « T + y(z • v), z d©fln@d as aboT®, Then, 
n{y) = ynfa), By oaloulation, 
n{z) » - MaXjXAz uAt, 
« - MBxiZa - 34/23, 3§/83 - 3a, 12/25), 
m 
wMch. becomes, 
n(z) » 5a - 3§/E3 a <1/S, 
nfz) « - 12/23 whea 1/3 < e < S/3, 
11(2) » 34/2B - 3A WLIEA A > 2/3* 
P has only pmlsMag points, hence wants to stay as olos® 
to V as possible on any given .half-ray froa -r, 'fhis set of 
points is z when 0 < a < 1» aod by inspection abo¥e, 
ItagiiCz) » • 1S/2S when 1/3 < a < S/3, 
aad z so defiaei is optimal for It is interesting to 
not© that the mrres of ®qmi*puiiishEi©»t in J* are strai.ght 
line segments insid© the subset wher© 0 < a < It euriri-
linear ©lsewh®r®« 
Gottj©©tares 
'flie relation between regular and irregular gamos needs 
further ©xsaination, ©speeially th@ rol© of F and Q- as 
functions of th® solution® of th© irregular games. On© 
specific inquiry would b© th® following# 
Qm&tion 1. Let A be irregular* ifhtn does there exist a 
B, F, and G auch that B i» regular, and, 
A « B • r + a, 
X®CB)X®(F) ^  0, Y®CB)Y«CG) ^  0? 
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If thQ laterseetloH of ©itlatr plaj#r listed were' not 
zero, tlisii til© s®t would toe optiaal. 
Ill© analysis has treatan eatir© glTOn, game witli no 
deletion of its eomponenta# How©t®i?, oortaia gaiaes ar® 
eitlier aolvable on iiispeotloa, or eaa to® simplifies hj easily 
soon dolotions. It wouM b© an atvaatage if tlaes® gases 
eould be recogaiz®^ witMa tii« tTmem&Tk of tli® aaalysis, 
 ^strletly d®t®mi.ii©d gam®. A is e gam® sweh tliat|, 
and is solvable on iRSpeetioB, Iirory class, T(")f 
strictly dotoraiined games, for instano®, aad tlies© 
games may b® regular or irregular, Ab  examples, E, f, 
G are striotly detowiaod, but 1 is regular while f and G 
are irregular in general# 
o.uostion S# Can tli# coniitioa tliat a game bo strictly 
determined be exprosaod eatiroly as a funetion of 
Synmotrio games liaT© taken om now iaportane® reeeatly 
(2, pp. 73), (S, pp* 81|, with eertain ooaputational metliods 
of solution, and new metlioAs of spMsetrizlng arbitrary games# 
A syaaotrlo gas© lias a skaw-ayiaiaetrie payoff iiatrls: and it 
is ©asily Torifled tliat V • V» Heneo, If the payoff is A, 
uAt - 0, will oil tmm& tliat if A is regular, tihen A e, T®CTrh 
Then by fheorea 1§, ualoss tho .Miaimua rank of a class ia oven 
§0 
ther# exist ao regular s|«©trie games is the elase# It 
can be shorn easily that a ii©e©ssarf and SEffloieat oonAition 
that a class hair© either a spiietrio or skew-spaaetrie payoff 
aatrix is that f _ prodnc# a syi'saietrie or sfcew-syaaaetrie 
Biatrix, respectively# This means, th«a, tha.t a class caimot 
have Ijoth a syaiietrio amd a sk8***spsietrio matrix. 
Sine® the el®ia®nts of a elass play m speeial rol® in 
its definitioa, it aeems that son® partieul.ar T might be 
con¥eal#nt to display aa sleaent of ®a©h.class for oomparieon 
and identification purposes# With no basis to favor one a or 
h over another, it aeeas reasoaabl©.to let a * e/a, h » ©/a. 
If this w®re don#, this r«pr®s®ntativ© element would display 
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